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The Employer's "Good Faith"Bargaining DutyA Troublesome Test in the Taft-Hartley Act

A

CHARGE FREQUENTLY LEVELED

against employers in proceed-

ings before the National Labor Relations Board is the refusal
to bargain in good faith as required by sections 8(a) (5) and 8(d)
of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) of 1947.1 Since
approximately one-third of all cases heard by the NLRB involve
refusal-to-bargain charges,2 it is important for an employer to know
what activities on his part will give rise to such a charge. This is
increasingly true in light of recent decisions requiring the employer
to bargain over such issues as subcontracting, plant removal, and
other activities formerly thought to be exclusively within the realm
of management's rights.3
The duty to bargain in good faith is imposed on both the employer and the representative of his employees by section 8(d) of
the LMRA.4 Sections 8(a) (5) and 8(b) (3)5 of the act make it
an unfair labor practice for employers and unions to refuse to bargain with each other, and since section 8 (d) modifies both of these
sections, it would seem at first glance that all refusal-to-bargain
charges against an employer must be interpreted in light of his
willingness to meet and confer in good faith about wages, hours,
and conditions of employment. Taken literally, the language of
section 8 (d) seems to require a finding of subjective bad faith on
1

Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8 (a) (5), 61 Star, 140-41
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964) [hereinafter cited as L.M.R-A.]. The section
reads: "(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . (5) To refuse to
bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees .... "
2
Thirtieth Annual Report of the Nat'l Labor Relations Board 180 (1965). The
report lists a total of 3815 section 8(a) (5) charges for the fiscal year 1965, which
represented 34.9% of all the charges filed with the Board. However, most of these
were not singular § 8(a) (5) charges, but were raised in combination with one or
more of the other prohibitive subsections of § 8 (a).
3 See notes 37-41 infra, and accompanying text.
4
L.M.R.A. § 8(d), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158d (1964). This section
reads:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance
of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment ....
5 L.M.R.A. § 8(b) (3), 61 Star. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (3) (1964). This
section is the counterpart of section 8(a) (5) and imposes the same duties on the unions in respect to bargaining as exist for the employer. The section reads: "(b) It shall
be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents ... (3) to refuse to
bargain collectively with an employer, provided it is the representative of his employees .... "
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the part of the employer to substantiate a refusal-to-bargain charge.
Such has not been the case, however. Decisions by the NIRB interpreting section 8(a) (5) have tended to divide the wide range
of employer activities which give rise to such a charge into three
broad categories, two of which are forbidden under the act.' First,
there are some acts which are so violative of the spirit of the LMRA
that they constitute unfair labor practices without a finding of subjective bad faith. These are said to be per se violations. A second
type of activity, less onerous than those of the previous category,
may be evidence of over-all bad faith. Within this grouping, conduct ranges from single acts which are conclusive of bad faith to
acts which are accorded only slight evidentiary value in the total
findings. Often, the decisions do not indicate what weight is given
to the various activities under scrutiny. A third type of conduct
consisting of economic pressure and harassing tactics is perfectly
consistent with the duty to bargain, and cannot be considered as
evidence of bad faith in any refusal-to-bargain charge.
The purpose of this Note is to categorize and discuss various
activities of employers within this tripartite framework, presupposing that the employer and the union have already entered into a
pattern of contract negotiations.7 An attempt will also be made
to indicate what weight the decisions have accorded to each type
of conduct within the evidentiary category.
I.

PER SE VIOLATIONS

Per se violations of section 8 (a) (5) do not require a finding of
subjective bad faith on the part of the employer. The single, controlling difference between these violations and other employer
activities is that they are considered so inconsistent with the duty
to bargain that one act alone will sustain a refusal-to-bargain charge
under section 8(a) (5), regardless of the employer's good faith
6
This impression is the author's own and results from an extensive study of NLRB
and federal court decisions interpreting 5 8(a) (5) of the Taft-Hartley Act since its
inception in 1947. Generalization is difficult, however, because of the indistinct boundary lines separating these categories and also because of the multiple-violation charges
which unions traditionally levy. The latter practice makes it nearly impossible to determine what weight the NLRB trial examiners attribute to each activity in the over-all

findings.
7 Refusals to bargain prior to the institution of negotiations comprise a significant
portion of the section 8 (a) (5) charges which the NLRB hears. These refusals are generally based on the lack of some prerequisite to managements duty to bargain with the
union, and are beyond the scope of this Note. Examples are refusals to bargain on the
grounds that the union does not in fact represent a majority of the workers, or that
there existed an irregularity, such as union coercion of voters, in the election itself.
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belief that his actions are justified. Among the prohibited activities in this category are unilateral changes in mandatory bargaining
subjects, refusals to supply financial data, refusals to discuss mandatory bargaining subjects, and several other miscellaneous actions.
A.

Unilateral Changes in Mandatory BargainingSubjects

Prior to 1962, the NLRB had consistently held that unilateral
changes by the employer in conditions about which the parties were
obligated to bargain was strong evidence of the employer's bad
faith.' In Williamsburg Steel Prods. Co.,9 the NLRB extended this
holding by finding that an employer who institutes wage increases
during bona fide contract negotiations without consulting the union
violates section 8(a)(5) regardless of his good faith in making the
change. The Supreme Court upheld the Board in NLRB v.Katz,0
finding that all three of the employer's changes - reducing the
number of sick leave days per year, increasing wages, and instituting
merit increases to twenty employees out of fifty in the unit - were
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining, which the employer
was required to discuss with the union. Any action withdrawing
one of these subjects from discussion was in effect a refusal to bargain, and the Board could hold such unilateral action to be a
violation of section 8(a) (5 ) without also finding the employer guilty
of over-all bad faith." However, the Court did not relegate -all
unilateral changes made by the employer to the per se category.
Instead, the Court stated that while there did exist "the possibility
that there might be circumstances which the Board could or should
accept as excusing or justifying unilateral action, no such case is
presented here ... ."12 In light of this statement, pre-Katz Board
rulings and court decisions which permitted isolated wage and merit
increases during bargaining so long as they did not represent a pattern, may still be valid.' 3
Since the Supreme Court in Katz specifically found that the par8
See, e.g., Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 70 N.L.R.B. 206 (1946), enforcement
denied, 167 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1948), rev'd, 337 U.S. 217 (1949).
9 126 N.L.R.B. 288 (1960), enforcement denied, NLRB v. Katz, 289 F.2d 700 (2d
Cir. 1961), rev'd, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
10 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
11ibid. See also NLRB v. Wonder State Mfg. Co., 344 F.2d 210 (8th Cir. 1965);
Carroll-Naslund Disposal, Inc., 152 N.L.R.B. No. 88 (1965); Insulating Fabricators,
Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. 1325 (1963), enforced, 338 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1964).
12 NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747-48 (1962).

13 See, e.g., NLRB v. Superior Fireproof Door & Sash Co., 289 F.2d 713 (2d Cir.
1961)(merit increases); White v. NLRB, 255 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1958)(isolated bo-

nuses and wage increases).
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ties had not bargained to an impasse, the question remained open
as to whether the existence of an impasse would justify the employer in increasing wages. Subsequently, however, in Dallas General Drivers v. NLRB,' 4 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that an employer could decrease wages unilaterally
where the union had demanded an increase and the parties had bargained to a stalemate on the wage issue. 5 Similarly, at least two
post-Katz decisions have upheld unilateral wage increases by the
employer where a genuine impasse existed in negotiations and an
increase was "necessary."' 1
The Board has held that a unilateral reduction in employee
working hours along with an unprecedented plant shutdown and
consequent layoff by the employer without consulting the union are
likewise per se violations of section 8 (a) (5 ).' This seems proper
in light of the decision in Katz and would appear to modify earlier cases holding that such activities were only strong evidence
of bad faith.'" The Board has also found that where an employer,
after union certification, unilaterally imposes minimum sales quotas
on employee salesmen, when none had existed before, such action
is a one-sided attempt to set conditions of employment and amounts
to a per se violation.' 9 Realistically, it would seem that the employer cannot make any changes in conditions which are mandatory
14 355 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1966).

15 The union maintained that since the parties continued to bargain and reached
agreements on other issues, there was no genuine impasse. The court rejected this argument however, saying that an agreement on other issues did not mean that an impasse
had not been reached on wages.
16
In NLRB v. Almeida Bus Lines, Inc., 333 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1964), the court
distinguished Katz on the grounds that a genuine impasse in bargaining had been
reached and the company representatives had discussed the issue with the union, whereas
in Katz the increase was sudden and undisclosed. The court also spoke of "economic
necessity" as a justification for the unilateral wage increase. One can question whether
the need for a raise should justify an employer in granting it unilaterally, when that is
the very thing the union is trying to achieve. Nevertheless, the same basic reasoning was
applied to sustain the increase in NLRB v. Southern Coach & Body Co., 336 F.2d 214
(5th Cir. 1964).
17Generac Corp., 149 N.L.R.B. No. 85 (1964). For earlier decisions holding that
such activity was only evidence of bad faith, see St. Cloud Foundry & Mach. Co., 130
N.L.R.B. 911, enforced, 295 F.2d 411 (6th Cir. 1961); Mount Hope Finishing Co., 106
N.L.R.B. 480 (1953), enforcement denied on other grounds, 211 F.2d 365 (4th Cir.
1954). A vigorous dissent in the latter case said that nothing in the LMRA restricted an
employer's right to go out of business.
18
See, e.g., NMRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952); NLRB v.
Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217 (1949); NI.RB v. Reed & Prince Mfg.
Co., 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953); NLRB v. Century
Cement Mfg. Co., 208 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1953).
19
Irvington Motors, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 565 (1964), enforced, 343 F.2d 759 (3d
Cir. 1965).
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subjects of collective bargaining under the Katz rationale, with the
probable exception of isolated wage changes which may be made
after consultation with the union.
B.

Refusal to Supply FinancialData
A second category of conduct which is considered a per se violation is a refusal on the part of the employer to furnish the union
with information on job rates and classifications, and other pertinent
financial data."0 The rationale for this position seems to be that
such information is essential to the union in establishing a meaningful set of demands. Thus, employers have been required to supply detailed statements of their financial condition when they deny
wage increases on the grounds of lack of resources.2" In one case
the NLRB found that an unwarranted delay in furnishing the requested information constituted a violation where the employer
failed to explain why he could not furnish the information on
time.
A few exceptions to the duty to supply requested wage information have been recognized in certain circumstances. The Board
has upheld an employer who failed to supply requested information
contained in thirty-one filing cabinets and covering over 800 jobs,
where the union was allowed to inspect and copy anything it desired. 21 In a recent case, the Seventh Circuit exonerated an employer who reduced wages because of a seeming inability to pay."
Various members of a trucking association claimed that they were
losing money on local hauls and demanded a wage cut in all drivers' categories. The association refused to supply the union with
financial information as to its over-all operations, and granted the
request only as to local hauling. The Board upheld a refusal-to20

NLRB v. Fitzgerald Mills Corp., 313 F.2d 260 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
834 (1963); Whitin Mach. Works, 108 N.L.R.B. 1537 (1954), enforced, 217 F.2d 593
(4th Cir. 1954). See also Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV.
1401 (1958).
21
NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); NLRB v. Taylor Foundry Co.,
338 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1964), enforcing 141 N.L.R.B. 765 (1963).
22
Dierk's Forests, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 923 (1964). Interestingly enough, while the
Board found that the refusal and later delay in furnishing requested information was a refusal to bargain per se, and violated § 8(a) (5) standing alone, it went on to say that
such conduct was only influential in determining the employer's over-all subjective bad
faith. This again is indicative that 5 8 (d) does not operate as an automatic modifier for
5 8(a) (5) and § 8(b) (3), as would appear from the reading of the former section.
See notes 1, 4, and 5 supra.
23
Administrative Decision of NIRB Gen. Counsel, 1961 CCH NLRB 10,502, No.
SR-1564.
2
4 United Fire Proof Warehouse Co. v. NLRB, 356 F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1966).
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However, on appeal the court stated that the

failure to supply requested information was not based on a claimed
inability to pay, but on a steadfast refusal to raise wages or maintain
them at existing levels. " The court further stated that since an
employer can always refuse to raise wages or could even demand a
decrease in rates, the association was under no duty to supply financial data.
If this decision stands, the duty to supply financial in-

formation may be easily avoided. The employer could evade a section 8(a) (5) charge by a carefully-worded reply bordering - but
not relying C.

on a claimed inability to pay.

Refusal to Discuss Mandatory Subjects

It is now well settled that any refusal by the employer to discuss
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining is a per se violation
of section 8(a) (5)." s This obviously requires a finding of whether
or not the particular item on which the charge is based is a "mandatory" subject. Anything embraced within the pJarase "wages,
hours, and conditions of employment" is a "mandatory" subject in
the language of section 8(d). Accordingly, unilateral wage changes
by an employer amount to a refusal to discuss the issue, and therefore constitute a per se violation. "Wages" include pensions,
group health and accident policies,"0 and bonuses.3 1 While the term
"hours" is fairly self-explanatory, the phrase "conditions of employment" has given rise to considerable litigation.
The NLRB has taken the position that the price of meals served
at a place of employment where public facilities are unavailable is
a mandatory subject. 2 The same is true with respect to leases on
company-owned homes. 3 On the other hand, employer contribu25

Boulevard Storage & Moving Co., 152 N.LR.B. No. 51 (1965), rev'd, United
Fire Proof Warehouse Co. v. NLRB, 356 F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1966).
2
6United Fire Proof Warehouse Co. v. NLRB, 356 P.2d 494, 498 (7th Cir. 1966).
27 lbd.
28
29

NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 P.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S.

960 (1949).
30 W. W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 1.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1949).
31 NLRB v. United States Air Conditioning Corp., 336 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1964);
NLRB v. Toffenerti Restaurant Co., 311 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
977 (1963); NLRB v. Wheeling Pipe Line, 229 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1956). Contra,
NLRB v. Wonder State Mfg. Co., 344 F.2d 210 (8th Cir. 1965).
32
Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 87 NJL.RB. 672 (1949).
33
Elgin Standard Brick Mfg. Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1467 (1950). Compare NLRB v.
Bemis Bros. Bag Co., 206 F.2d 33 (5th Cir. 1953), where the court said an employer did

not have to bargain over the rental of company-owned houses when the rent was below
the market price, and living in them was optional for the employee.
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tions to a fund to promote a certain industry through advertising,"
and the giving of indemnity or performance bonds,35 have both
been held to be outside the mandatory bargaining realm.
When an employer decides to move or shut down his business,
or subcontract or discontinue an operation, must he bargain with
the union about it? The subject deserves special mention, since it
is one of the most prevalent issues in the area of "mandatory" bargaining. Management consistently maintains that such decisions
relate solely to the running of the business, and are a matter of management discretion, particularly where motivated by economic necessity.36 The NLRB and the courts have not always agreed. In
Town & Country Mfg. Co.,. the Board held that subcontracting,
even for economic reasons, was a mandatory item within the "other
terms and conditions of employment" phraseology of section 8(d).
A more recent Supreme Court decision, Fibreboard Paper Prods.
Corp. v. NLRB,"8 can be interpreted as limiting the Town & Country holding to a certain extent. In Fibreboard,management decided to contract out work that the plant employees were capable of
doing and in fact had been doing under an old contract. In upholding a Board order that the company must discuss this issue with
the union, the Supreme Court said:
ITihe type of "contracting out" involved in this case - the replacement of employees in the existing bargaining unit with those
of an independent contractor to do the same work under similar
conditions of employment - is a statutory subject of collective
bargaining under § 8(d). Our decision need not and does not
encompass other forms of "contracting out" or "subcontracting'
which arise daily in our complex economy. 39
Thus the door does not seem to be dosed to all types of subcontracting by the employer.
The Court has found that an employer has the unrestricted right
34Mill Floor Covering, Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. 769 (1962), enforced, 317 F.2d 269
(6th Cir. 1963).
35
Excello Dry Wall Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 663 (1963), enforced, 50 CCH Lab. Cas.
31916 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
36
Economic necessity seems to be one clear justification for plant removal. The
problem is at least as closely related to the §§ 8(a) (1) and (3) violations as it is to §
8 (a) (5), since the "runaway shop" is often a weapon employed by management to undermine the union and discourage union membership. Again, the topic is beyond the
scope of this article. Some articles treating the subject in depth are Sheinkman, Plant
Removal Under the National Labor Relations Act, 38 TEMP. L.Q. 229 (1965); and
Turner, Plant Removals and Related Problems, 13 LAB. L.J. 907 (1962).
37136
N.L.1RB. 1022 (1962), enforced, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963).
38 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
39 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 215 (1964).
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to cease operations for any reason short of a clear intention to
destroy the union,40 and it would seem that a subcontracting operation which was absolutely vital to the continuation of the business
might also fall within the realm of management prerogatives. Another justifiable action would seem to be the subcontracting of a
new operation, or parts of it, over which the union never had jurisdiction. Curiously enough, the Board does not seem to consider
plant removal to be in the same per se category as subcontracting."1
This appears somewhat inconsistent, since plant removal looks at
first glance to be just as destructive of jobs as subcontracting. A
possible justification for this classification lies in the fact that the
Board could shape a remedy in the former situation so as to require a moving employer to carry the employees with him.
A 1958 Supreme Court decision illustrates some of the farreaching effects of classifying a subject as mandatory or non-mandatory. In NLRB v.Borg-Warner Corp.,42 management insisted that
any contract it negotiated must contain a ballot clause, calling for a
secret, pre-strike employee vote on the last offer, and a "recognition" clause which excluded the certified international union as a
party to the contract and substituted its uncertified local affiliate.
The Court found that neither of these demands were mandatory
subjects, hence insistence on their inclusion in the contract -was a
refusal to bargain about other items which were mandatory subjects, and a per se violation.
Miscellaneoms Per Se Violations
In a few other situations, the language of the NIRB and the
courts has indicated extension of the per se doctrine to other employer activities. Among these have been insistence on the inclusion of illegal provisions in a contract43 and an announced re-

D.

40

Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).

This point

remains somewhat unclear. It appears that the employer has an absolute right to go
out of business if he so desires, and lower courts have said that this right exists even if
the closing of the business is generated by anti-union animosity. NLRB v. New England
Web, Inc., 309 F.2d 696 (1st Cir. 1962); NI.RB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170
(2d Cir. 1961). However, the Court in Darlington qualified this right by insisting that
it must be a true shut-down, not a mere paper change in corporate entity, or a plant
removal.
41
See Standard Handkerchief Co., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 2 (1965), discussed at text
accompanying notes 110-12 ipfra.
42 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
43
See, e.g., NLRB v. Amalgamated Lithographers of America, 309 F.2d 31 (9th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963) (ban on overtime work instituted to obtain a
"hot cargo' clause); NLRB v. National Maritime Union, 175 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 955 (1950) (bargaining for discriminatory hiring hall clause).
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fusal to discuss any changes from the contract then in force.44 Similarly, an employer has been held to violate section 8(a) (5) without
a showing of bad faith where he refuses to bargain with a certified
representative of the employees during a strike,45 or where he
agrees to bargain only with the non-strikers when part of the employees are out on strike.4
One court of appeals found it was a
per se violation for the employer to refuse to negotiate grievances
with a representative of the union, on the ground he had not been
appointed by the union executive board in the manner specified
in their constitution. 7 A source of uncertainty is a recent Second
Circuit decision which held that it was a per se violation for a
member of a multi-employer bargaining group to withdraw from
the group after contract negotiations had commenced, with no showing that the unit was an inappropriate bargaining agent 4 8
II.

EMPLOYER CONDUCT EVIDENCING BAD FAITH
IN BARGAINING

With the exception of the situations mentioned previously,49 all
other acts of the employer are only indicative of bad faith, and a
violation of the good faith clause of section 8(d) must be found
before the activity can be construed as a refusal to bargain. In
order to gain an understanding of those acts which constitute bad
faith, it is necessary to first examine the employer's duties.
44

Hollywood Brands, Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 304 (1963), enforced, 324 F.2d 956 (5th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 923 (1964); Weinacker Bros., 153 N.L.R.B. No. 40
(1965).
45R- J. Oil & Refining Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 641 (1954).
4
6Knight Morley Corp., 116 N.L.R.B. 140 (1956), enforced, 251 F.2d 753 (6th
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 927 (1958). The Board also said that the expiration
of an old collective bargaining agreement relieved the employer of any duty to discuss
grievance procedures which had arisen under it with the union, but that expiration of
the old contract revived the general statutory duty to bargain under § 8(a) (5). On
this point the court of appeals reversed, saying that such a result was inconsistent with
the holding in Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947) and
approved in NLRB v. Standard Oil Co., 196 F.2d 892 (6th Cir. 1952). The rationale
of these cases was that an employer can channel an unsettled grievance through an
agreed grievance procedure even after the contract has expired, and such action will not
be a refusal to bargain.
47
Prudential Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1960). The court said that
an appointment procedure was strictly a matter of internal union business, in which the
employer could have no legitimate interest. A refusal to bargain with the appointee
was therefore a refusal to bargain per se, regardless of the employer's good faith in contesting the appointment. The employer apparently felt the union officials were overworked and were attempting to delegate grievance negotiations to unqualified personnel.
48
NLRB v. Sheridan Creations, Inc., 357 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1966).
49 See the examples discussed at text accompanying notes 8-48 supra.
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The Employer's Duties in General

A great many attempts have been made since passage of the
LMRA in 1947 to define the employer's duty to bargain under
section 8(d)." In essence, they all impose the same three basic
requirements: (1) the employer must meet with the union at a reasonable time and place; (2) he must carefully consider the union's
proposals and demands; (3) and he must make counterproposals
for any that he rejects as unsatisfactory.5 Beyond these requirements, the federal courts have been reluctant to impose any restrictions on the employer.5" The courts have been adamant in their
position that an employer's failure to make concessions to the
union, or to retreat from his position on an issue, does not alone
constitute bad faith bargaining. This attitude has often shown up
in verbal reprimands to the NLRB when the Board has shown a
tendency to infer bad faith from the employer's adherence to a
stubborn bargaining position. In the leading case of NLRB v.
American Nat'l Ins. Co.,5 the Board held that bargaining for the
inclusion of a "management rights" clause in the agreement, covering promotions, discipline, and work scheduling, was a per se violation." In reversing the Board's decision, the Supreme Court said
that bargaining for management rights clauses covering some conditions of employment was to be reviewed in light of the good faith
test, not automatically characterized as a per se violation. The Court
chastised the Board for attempting to set itself up as the judge of
what concessions an employer must make, and of the proposals and
50
See NIlRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952); NLRB v. Reed &
Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953); NLRB v.
Bachelder, 120 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1941), cer. denied, 314 U.S. 647 (1941), modified,
125 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1942); Globe Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 91 (5th Cit.
1939).
51
Iasko Metal Prods., Inc., 148 NJ.-L.B. 976 (1964). See also Dierk's Forests,
Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 923 (1964). A federal judge has defined the duty as an obligation
of the employer and the representative of the employees:
To enter into discussion with an open and fair mind, and a sincere purpose
to find a basis of agreement touching wages and hours and conditions of labor,
and if found to embody it in a contract as specific as possible, which shall
stand as a mutual guaranty of conduct, and as a guide for the adjustment of
grievances. Globe Cotton Mils v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1939).
52 The Board is usually not so reluctant, and the thirty-year history of the Wagner
and Taft-Hardey Acts is filled with many instances of court reversals of Board opinions
for imposing requirements on the parties beyond its authorization. See, e.g., American
Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union,
361 U.S. 477 (1960); NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952); NLRB
v. Cascade Employers Ass'n, 296 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1961).
t1 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
5 NILRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952).
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counterproposals that he may or may not offer. The case provides
an excellent discussion of the general duties of the employer at
the bargaining table, and the limitations on the Board in inferring
bad faith from his stand on substantive contract terms.
B.

Specific Employer Conduct as Evidence of Bad Faith

(1) "Hard" Bargaining.-It has been very difficult for the
Board and the courts to distinguish between a stubborn, legitimate
stand by an employer on a particular subject, and the subterfuge of
surface bargaining with no intent to reach an agreement. The former is completely consistent with the requirements of section 8(d),
while the latter is a method of circumventing the act by outward
compliance with its terms. It is fundamental that an employer
does not satisfy the requirements of the act by entering into bargaining with a mind sealed against agreement. 5 Although failure
of negotiations is not in itself determinative of the employer's state
of mind, "the duty to bargain in good faith is not satisfied by merely
meeting with union representatives to inform them that the employer cannot or will not change its position."5 6 Nor can an employer circumvent the duty to bargain by making such patently
ridiculous counterproposals that no union official could possibly accept them. 57 In NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co.,58 after an exhaustive study of the bargaining negotiations, the court said:
It is difficult to believe that the Company with a straight face and
in good faith could have supposed that this proposal had the

slightest chance of acceptance by a self-respecting union, or even
that it might advance the negotiations by affording a basis of dis-

55
NLRB v. Almeida Bus Lines, Inc., 333 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Reeves
Broadcasting & Dev. Corp., 336 F.2d 590 (4th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Griswold Mfg.
Co., 106 F.2d 713 (3d Cir. 1939).
56 NLRB v. Israel Putnam Mills, 197 F.2d 116, 117 (2d Cit. 1952). See also Vanderbilt Prods. v. NLRB, 297 F.2d 833 (2d Cit. 1961); NLRB v. Century Cement Mfg.
Co., 208 F.2d 84 (2d Cit. 1953).
57 See, e.g., United States Gypsum Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 112 (1951), enforced in part
and denied in part, 206 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 912 (1954),
where management made the following demands: (1) the unlimited right to set individual wage rates and job classifications; (2) the absolute right to select employees for
lay off, transfer, and promotion; (3) cessation of all union activity on company property,
including all activities taking place on the employee's own time; (4) no union representation at grievance meetings unless requested by management; and (5) assumption by
the union of responsibility for all strikes at the plant, including unauthorized, wildcat
strikes. See also Vanderbilt Prods. v. NLRB, 297 F.2d 833 (2d Cit. 1961), where the
demands were: (1) a completely open shop with no maintenance of membership provisions; (2) absolute management rights to discharge and lay off with no seniority restrictions; and (3) a five-year contract.
58205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953).
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cussion; rather, it looks more like a stalling tactic by a party bent
upon~maintaining the pretense of bargaining.5 9

Occasionally, the decisional language of the NLRB indicates a
tentative return to the refuted position that bad faith can be inferred from a stubborn refusal by the employer to make concessions.
In Denton Co.,60 the Board decided that an employer's concessions
in granting bulletin board space and overtime pay, and in assuming
responsibility for maintenance of plant health and safety conditions, were not substantial enough in light of a steadfast refusal to
recede from a hard position concerning grievance procedures, union
security, dues check-off, and paid vacations and holidays. Since
the concessions were characterized as illusory in that most of them
were required under either federal or state law, the Board held
that the failure to grant concessions on substantial issues could properly be considered as evidence of bad faith. On its face, the decision
seems incorrect, and probably would not survive present-day court
scrutiny. Yet, it illustrates the strong temptation to regard adherence to a stubborn, legitimate position as evidence of bad faith. The
Board has further circumvented the restrictions placed upon it in
NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co."' by adopting the position that
an employer who enters into negotiations with a set mind and an
59 ld. at 139. Reed & Prince probably represents the most exhaustive court study
of the problem of inferring bad faith from a position adopted at the bargaining table.
The company responded to an initial union request for meetings on August 9th by
stating that it could not possibly meet before September 15th. It delayed in furnishing
wage rate data requested on August 9th until October. When the first meetings were
finally held, the company refused to discuss dues check-off on the grounds that its was
not a proper subject of bargaining - an erroneous position. It also rejected union
proposals on grievance procedure, wage increases, and seniority, and refused a proposal
to pay any bonuses, or adopt any pension plan whatsoever. Management never offered
any counterproposals except a seniority provision culled from the expired contract, and
a small wage increase. There was also quibbling and refusal on several minor issues,
such as bulletin board space, supplying employees with a record of their achievements
in piecework, etc. Only on November 10, after eight meetings, did the company submit its first proposed contract. After rejection, the union struck, and the company refused arbitration or mediation. One company agent told an employee the company
would never sign a contract with the union. Finally, claiming an impasse had been
reached, the management granted a 10-cent wage increase.
After reviewing all these facts, the Board ordered the employer to cease and desist
from refusing to bargain with the union. In upholding the Board's order, the court
upheld its basic argument that it must take some cognizance of the reasonableness of
positions adopted by the employer during negotiations, and while it could not force the
employer to make concessions on any issue, "the employer is obliged to make some
reasonable effort in some direction to compose his differences with the union, if 8(a)(5)
is to be read as imposing any substantial obligation at all." Id. at 134-35. See also
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).
60 106 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1953), enforced as modified, 217 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 981 (1955).
61343 U.S. 395 (1952).
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announced decision that the expired contract is the only thing he
will agree to has "not assumed a bargaining position." 2
(2) Stalling Negotiations.-Frequently management will attempt to avoid reaching an agreement with the union by deliberately
stalling until there is a break down in negotiations or until it has
had an opportunity to undermine the union in a new election. If
deliberate stalling tactics can be proved, they are usually conclusive
evidence of bad faith. Normally, however, stalling is so difficult
to prove that it rarely is relied on as conclusive evidence of the
employer's attitude. It is usually cited in conjunction with other
evidence to build a case of over-all bad faith.
There are any number of tactics an employer can adopt to stall
negotiations. The NLRB has held that an unnecessary delay in
furnishing information which would make the bargaining meaningful, such as wage rates and job classifications, is strong evidence of
bad faith.6" Again, since section 8(d) specifically requires the employer to "meet at reasonable times" with the union, a persistent
refusal to schedule new meetings at the dose of a bargaining session
has been held by the Board to be highly indicative of bad faith."
The fact that the employer's chief negotiator lives several hundred
miles away and has a busy and uncertain schedule, is no excuse for
a refusal to schedule future meetings.65
Occasionally an employer will delay future negotiations pending
the outcome of de-certification proceedings, or because of a genuine doubt as to the union's majority status. At least one case has
said that an employer is obligated to negotiate with the certified
representative of the employees throughout the certification period,
even if it is obvious the union no longer represents a majority of the
employees.66
62

Hollywood Brands, Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 304, enforced, 324 F.2d 956 (5th Cit.
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 923 (1964).
63
NLRB v. Kit Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 166 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 910
(1965); Butcher Boy Refrigerator Door Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 1360 (1960), enforced,
290 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1960). One case, however, has spoken of a similar delay in terms
of a per se violation, much as a refusal to supply such information. See note 22 supra
and accompanying text.
64
Solo Cup Co. v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 447 (4th Cir. 1964), enforcing 142 N.LRB.
1290 (1963); See also Exchange Parts Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 710 (1962), enforced, 339
F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1965).
65 Insulating Fabricators, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. 1325 (1963), enforced, 338 F.2d 1002
(4th Cir. 1964).
66
NLRB v. Satilla Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 322 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1963).
Contra Carpinteria Lemon Ass'n v. NLRB, 274 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1960). The rule announced by the Supreme Court is that an employer must bargain with a certified union
for one year following certification, even if he believes, in good faith, that it no longer
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Sickness or disability of the employer's chief negotiator is a justification for postponing scheduled talks with the union, and is not
evidence of bad faith."7 However, the Board in one case found that
two brothers had bargained in bad faith when one of them had a
heart attack during negotiations, and the other refused to carry on
discussions or to postpone them to a reasonable future date. The
Board relied heavily on the fact that the healthy brother continued
to run the business and made all other management decisions, induding the filing of an election petition, discharging of strikers,
and the hiring of replacements."8 This seems to be in keeping with
the employer's duty to promptly reschedule meetings and make expeditious and prompt arrangements for negotiations. 9 A final type
of stalling tactic which the Board has held to be evidence of bad
faith is where the employer conditions the continuance of bargaining
on the withdrawal of an unfair labor practice charge filed by the
70

union.

(3) Change of Position.-Occasionallythe parties will arrive
at a tentative or final agreement on a particular subject after a long
and arduous bargaining session, only to have the employer repudiate or "shift" position on it at a later time. The general rule,
stated repeatedly in the older cases, is that such changes of position
during bargaining are to be expected as part of the give and take
of the bargaining process. 1 The NLRB has held that an employer
can withdraw an offer after it has been rejected by the union,72 and
represents a majority of the employees. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954). A
later federal case, however, has followed the reasoning of numerous decisions holding
that an employers refusal to enter into negotiations is justified if motivated by a sincere
doubt as to the union's majority status. Although the parties had held numerous bargaining sessions, the court indicated that a discontinuance of further negotiations might
be allowed, until the status of the union as bargaining agent was determined. Fetzer
Television, Inc., 317 F.2d 420 (6th Cir. 1963).
67
American Laundry Mach. Co., 76 N.LR.B. 981 (1948), enforced, 174 F.2d 124
(6th Cir. 1949); Administrative Decision of NLRB Gen. Counsel, 1966 CCH NLRB
5 9879, No. SR-1236.
68
Bdward E. Gurian & Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 473 (1960).
69 For an explanation of the scope of this duty, see J. H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 86
N.LR.B. 470 (1949); Burgie Vinegar Co., 71 N.L.R.B. 829 (1946). The Board is
quick to assert, however, that it is the duty of the union to request bargaining sessions,
and no scheduling duty rests on the employer until such requests are made. Solo Cup
Co. v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 447 (4th Cir. 1964), enforcing 142 N.LR.B. 1290 (1963).
70
NLRB v. Kit Mfg. Co., 225 F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
910 (1965).
71
See, e.g., NLRB v. Hart Cotton Mills, Inc., 190 F.2d 964 (4th Cir. 1961); Clinton
Foods, Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 239 (1955); Fehr Baking Co., 104 NL.R.B. 240 (1953).
72
Perfect Serv. Gas Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1686 (1964); Solar Aircraft Co., 109 N.L.R.B.
130 (1954).
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a retreat to a lower offer on a single item, such as wage rates, is
justified where the higher offer was part of a "package" deal which
the union rejected." A sudden worsening of a company's financial
position is justification for a shifting position on wages. 4
The degree of finality of an offer is also important in determining whether there has been an unreasonable change of position. In
1959, the Board refused to sustain a charge of bad faith bargaining
when the employer withdrew a tentative offer adopted at the very
outset of negotiations which was never finalized or accepted.7
In recent years, some deep inroads have been made on the general rule that changes of position during bargaining sessions are not
evidence of bad faith. The breakthrough has come in cases where the
employer withdraws a wage offer which the union has accepted
and replaces it with a lower one;" where management suddenly
demands an open shop clause after previously agreeing to union
security provisions;77 and where an employer refuses to sign an agreement on the grounds that the union does not represent a majority
of the employees after he had previously abandoned this argument.7" A recent Ninth Circuit opinion has indicated that withdrawing previously-accepted proposals is conclusive evidence that
management is engaging only in "sham" or surface bargaining
with no intent to reach an agreement.7"
(4) Dilatory Tactics.-The first type of conduct which the
NLRB seems to consider as conclusive evidence of bad faith, is a
refusal by the employer to sign an agreement after it has been reduced to writing."0 The same holds true when management negotiates an agreement with the union, but later insists that the individual employees sign it.8"
73 Stoner Rubber Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1440 (1959).
4Administrative Decision of NLRB Gen. Counsel, Case No. F-818, 43 L.R.R.M.

7

1299 (1958).
75
Southern States' Equip. Corp., 124 N.LR.B. 833 (1959).
76
C & D Coal Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 799 (1951).
77
Marley Co., 150 N.LR.B. No. 82 (1965).
78 Cheney Cal. Lumber Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1945), enforced, 154 F.2d 112 (9th
Cir. 1946). See also Safeway Steel Scaffords Co., 153 N.L.R.B. No. 32 (1965); Great
Western Broadcasting Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 93 (1962); Commercial Chem. Co., 103
N.L.R.B. 465 (1953).
79 NLRB v. J.A. Terteling & Sons, 357 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1966).
80 See generally Artistic Embroidery, Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 974 (1963); Mixer Mobile
Mfrs., Inc., 149 N.L.R.B. 592 (1964). However, a mere delay in executing a contract
when the employer is willing to negotiate is not evidence of bad faith. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 154 N.L.R.B. No. 72 (1965).
81 Stylecraft Furniture Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 930 (1955).
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A second situation indicative of bad faith is a failure on the
part of the employer to give his bargaining representative authority
to enter into an agreement or to make any concession.82 No case
decided thus far has said that such conduct would constitute bad
faith standing alone, whereas several have said it would not.8 However, the Board has said that a withdrawal of bargaining authority
from a representative after agreement was reached is enough to
show management's bad faith.' A similar conclusion was reached
in a situation where either the employer or his attorney failed to
attend most of the bargaining sessions, and each insisted he could
not enter into an agreement in the absence of the other.85
Another class of dilatory activities highly indicative of bad faith
is when the employer by-passes the certified union and makes his offers directly to the employees. At first glance, such an offer would
seem to be a per se refusal to bargain with the certified agent of the
employees. However, the NLRB and the courts have chosen to
speak of such offers in terms of bad faith, while recognizing that the
single act is conclusive of bad faith in most situations.8 8 Thus, an
offer of wage increases to employees if they would abandon the
union was held to be bad faith bargaining.
The same holds true
for better wages offered to the employees, individually, than to the
union," or better offers to a company-based union sponsored by the
employer than to a rival international union." Conversely , an offer
to individual workers generally to "sit in" on negotiations was not
bad faith where there was only a sincere desire to educate the work82

Roy E. Hanson, Jr., Mfr., 137 N.L.R.B. 251 (1962).
See, e.g., Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. NLRB, 216 F.2d 273 (9th Cir. 1954),
modified, 220 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1955).
8 Gittlin Bag Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 1159 (1951), enforced, 196 F.2d 158 (4th Cir.
1952).
s5 Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., v. NLRB, 216 F.2d 273 (9th Cir. 1954), modified, 220
F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1955).
86 See generally NLRB v. Niederman, 334 F.2d 601 (2d Cit. 1964); National Linen
Serv. Corp., 48 N.L.R.B. 171 (1943); Weinacker Bros., 153 N.L.R.B. No. 40 (1965);
Mayes Bros., 153 N.L.R.B. No. 1 (1965); Nickey Chevrolet Sales, Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 23
83

(1963).
87

Wheeler Elec. Membership Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. No. 99 (1965). See also Houston Sheet Metal Contractor's Ass'n, 147 N.L.R.B. 774 (1964), where the employer offered higher wages and more paid vacations if striking workers would abandon the
union and return to work, and added insult to injury by guaranteeing to pay any fines
the union might levy on them.
88
Northeastern Indiana Broadcasting Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 1381 (1950).
89
Colson Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 128 (8th Cit. 1965); Wein-Joseph Weinstein
Elec. Corp., 152 N.L.R.B. No. 3 (1965).
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ers in the bargaining process with no intent to undermine the
union."
A fourth situation which the NLRB occasionally considers to be
evidence of dilatory tactics in bargaining is the employer's insistence
on piecemeal, short-term contracts. The rationale for this attitude
seems to be that the LMRA contemplates fruitful agreements which
will govern the employment relationship for an extended period, and
insistence on short term contracts violates the spirit, if not the letter,
of the act. Recently, the NLRB stated that one clear example of
such conduct was a case in which the employer refused to negotiate
a contract extending past the union's certification year and then
stalled the meetings so long that the completed contract would only
have been in effect for seven weeks. 1 The short term contract was
held to be acceptable, however, where the original election had
shown a majority of only three, and it seemed likely the union would
lose this slim margin under normal turnover. "
Certain other dilatory conduct has been held to be evidence of
bad faith in isolated cases. A refusal to codify certain proposals into
the contract on the grounds they were present company practices,
or were required by law, is indicative of an intent not to honor
the agreements in the future."3 Also indicative of bad faith has
been the refusal to allow the union's chief negotiator on company
premises during negotiation,"4 and the insistence that the union bargain separately with each of four citrus growers associations, although all four produced the same product, had headquarters in the
same city, and were represented by common counsel.9"
(5) Breaking Off Talks.--Generally speaking, the duty to bargain is a continuous one, and there are few situations which will
justify an employer in breaking off talks over unsettled issues. The
duty has been consistently held to extend through a strike period.9"
90

Cox Market, Inc., 155 N.L.R.B. No. 1 (1965).

91

Capitol Aviation, Inc., 152 N.LR.B. No. 80 (1965), enforcement denied, 355
F.2d 875 (7th Cit. 1966). See also NLRB v. W. R. Hall Distrib., 341 F.2d 359 (10th
Cir. 1965).
92 Capitol Aviation, Inc. v. NLRB, 355 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1966).
93 Seniorita Hosiery Mills, Inc., 115 N.L.R.B. 1304 (1956).
94
Deena Artware, Inc., 86 N.L.R-3. 732 (1949), enforced as modified, 198 F.2d
645 (6th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 906 (1953).
9
5 Carpinteria Lemon Ass'n v. NLRB, 274 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1960).
96
NLRB v. Southern Coach & Body Co., 336 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1964). See also
NLRB v. United States Cold Storage Corp., 203 F.2d 924 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 818 (1953), where the court said that although there was an impasse in bargaining,
it had been broken by the strike, and the company did not fulfill its duty to bargain in
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Perhaps the most common instance of an employer discontinuing
talks is where he thinks he holds the upper hand, and does it as a
pressure tactic against the union. In NLRB v. Satilla Rural Elec.
Membership Corp.,97 management refused to grant a scheduled
wage increase to union workers on the grounds the rates were being
"negotiated." Other employees not represented by the union received increases. The employer then circulated a petition, signed by
the majority of employees, which stated that the union no longer
represented them. Thereafter all offers were made directly to the
workers as a body and talks with the union were cut off. The Board
ordered the dissident employer to resume his negotiations, at least
until the certification period had run out, and held such tactics to be
conclusive evidence of bad faith. Similarly, the Board charged an
employer with bad faith bargaining where the parties had almost
reached an agreement, but the employer suddenly broke off the
talks on learning that a union strike had failed. 8
Occasionally an employer is justified in breaking off talks. In
NLRB v. FloridaCitrus Canners Co-op.," the citrus crop suffered a
severe freeze while the parties were negotiating a new contract. The
employer suspended talks without requesting a delay upon receiving the union's ultimatum that an agreement had to be reached that
day or the employees were going out on strike. Both the NLRB
and the court upheld this action saying that the emergency justified
it, and the act did not require the making of a useless request. At
least one case has suggested that an employer can temporarily suspend negotiations in order to clear up a good faith doubt as to the
union's majority status.'
(6) Anti-union Statements.-As early as 1940, a federal court
adopted the position that disparaging remarks by an employer
against unions in general and the NLRB in particular were not indicative of bad faith in bargaining. 1 ' The court said that no stategood faith by requesting that the union submit its proposals in writing for consideration,
but refusing to meet with it.
97 322 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1963).
98
NLRB v. Fitzgerald Mills, Inc., 313 F.2d 260 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
834 (1963).
09288 F.2d 630 (5th Cir. 1961), denying enforce/ment of 124 N.L.R.B. 1182
(1959). See also NLRB v. Minute-Maid Corp., 283 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1960), enforcing
124 N.L.R.B. 355 (1959).
100 See Fetzer Television, Inc., 317 F.2d 420 (6th Cir. 1963), discussed in note 64
supra. The court also said that another factor justifying postponement was the fact
that two reviews of other charges were pending before federal court.
10 1 NLRB v. Lightner- Publishing Co., 113 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1940). The anti-
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ment of a general opinion, as such, can constitute an unfair labor
practice.'02 The 1940 rule probably still holds true as to general
statements,' or in situations in which the union tries to twist intemperate remarks, made at the bargaining table during heated
discussion, into evidence of bad faith."0 4 As to other statements,
however, there has been a steady erosion of the idea that an employer is free to speak his mind and have his comments ignored by
the fact finders in all cases. 0 5 Such comments are still only slight
evidence of bad faith, but when considered in conjunction with other
conduct may well be persuasive. The statements vary, of course, in
intensity. A comment by a company general manager to a union
steward to "Get those union agitating sons of bitches out of Fitzgerald [the company]," and that he would "die and go to hell"
before he would sign a contract with the union, speaks for itself.0" '
A request to the employees that they get up a petition to throw the
union out, coupled with a remark that he was meeting with the
union only to avoid a refusal-to-bargain charge, is even more indicative of the employer's bad faith.'07
Occasionally a great deal of weight is accorded to anti-union
sentiments expressed by management. In one recent case a federal
court sustained a bad faith charge by the Board based largely on
minimal questioning of employees by management officials as to
how they were going to vote during a forthcoming union election
union statements appeared in print, were directed to the public at large, and were made
sometime after the union had filed its unfair labor practice charge.
102 d. at 626.
103 See NLRB v. Dale Indus., Inc., 355 F.2d 851, 852 (6th Cit. 1966), where the
court said:
The expression of any views shall not be evidence of an unfair labor practice if such expressions contain no threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit.
104 Administrative Decision of NLRB Gen. Counsel, Case No. F-758 (1958).
105 Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887
(1953); International Furniture Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 127 (1953), enforced, 212 F.2d 431
(5th Cir. 1954). See generally Braswell Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. No.
20 (1965).
108NLRB v. Fitzgerald Mills, Inc., 313 F.2d 260 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
834 (1963). See also NLRB v. Swift & Co., 127 F.2d 30 (6th Cir. 1942), where the
employer stated he would not agree to bind himself for a single day to continue the
existing forty hour week; Solo Cup Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1290 (1963), enforced, 332 F.2d
447 (4th Cir. 1964), where the employer's foreman told workers that as far as the company was concerned the union would never get a contract, and when he found out
who the union agitators were, he said he was going to "give it to them up here," drawing
a finger across his throat.
107NLRB v. W. R. Hall Distrib., 341 F.2d 359 (10th Cir. 1965), enforcing, 144
N.L.R.B. 1285 (1963).
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and whether they were satisfied with their salaries. 08 There was
other evidence of bad faith in the trial examiner's findings, but the
court in enforcing the charge attached undue significance to the
aforementioned statements. Such reliance might be rationalized,
however, on the employer's duty to refrain from any coercion prior
to election. There do not seem to be any opinions where statements
alone have been conclusive of bad faith.
(7) Private Management Matters.-Frequently the employer
will refuse to discuss certain aspects of the employment relationship
with the union, on the grounds that they are strictly the concern of
management. If the reserved subject is a mandatory one, there is
obviously a refusal to bargain over it, and it would seem to be a
per se violation. The older cases spoke of such conduct in terms of
.bad faith, however, and the language has carried over to modern
cases. In NLRB v.Wonder State Mfg. Co., 9 the court exonerated
management from refusing to discuss Christmas bonuses, on the
grounds they were not properly a part of wages. Since they were
not offered consistently, nor uniform in amount, they were termed
gifts, not wages, and a refusal to discuss them was not bad faith bargaining. It seems safe to assert that the courts will abandon the bad
faith language in the near future, however, and refusals to discuss
mandatory subjects will be universally classified as per se violations.
The failure to discuss plant removal has also been attacked
as bad faith bargaining, rather than as a per se violation. In
Standard Handkerchief Co.,"' the NLRB found that an employer's
failure to mention the removal of his business to the union negotiator, at a time when he was secretly concluding the transfer, reduced
the negotiations to little more than an "exercise in,frivolity," and
was conclusive evidence of bad faith bargaining. Other cases have
said that a refusal to discuss an arbitration dause"' or a proposed
dues checkoff" amounted to bad faith.
108 NLRB v. The Coachman's Inn, 357 F.2d 134 (8th Cir. 1966).
109 344 F.2d 210 (8th Cir. 1965). Compare cases where bonuses were held to be
regular remuneration, and in reality wages within the meaning of the statute. NLRB
v. Citizen's Hotel Co., 326 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Electric Steam Radiator
Corp., 321 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. United States Air Conditioning Corp.,
336 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Niles-Bement Pond Co., 199 F.2d 713 (2d
Cir. 1952).
110 151 NJ.R.B. No. 2 (1965). See also Rapid-Bindery, Inc., 127 N.LLB.212
(1960), enforced, 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961); Vac-Art Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 989

(1959).
M Dixie Corp., 105 N.L.R.B. 390 (1953). The refusal to discuss arbitration was
part of an over-all attitude of management that it need make no concessions at all, and
could insist 6n complete control to run its plant as always. The trial examiner held
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A few cases have upheld the employer's right to refuse to discuss
even mandatory subjects. In NLRB v. Southern Coach & Body
Co.," 3 the Board upheld an employer who refused to discuss layoffs
with the union, relying on the fact that the seasonal nature of the
work necessitated frequent layoffs and recalls, and the employer was
always willing to discuss his layoff policy with the union.
Frequently the employer insists, as a condition of bargaining,
that his rights be enumerated in a "management rights" clause of
the contract. The leading cases have sustained the employer's right
to such a clause, providing it does not withdraw mandatory subjects
from bargaining." 4 There seems to be somewhat of a split when
the clause does cover mandatory subjects, however, because a few
cases have held that an employer's insistence on a management
rights clause covering wage rates, shop
rules, and merit increases did
5
not amount to bad faith bargaining."
(8) The Take-it-or-Leave-it Attitude.-In 1964 the International Union of Electricians challenged the General Electric Company's entire attitude toward collective bargaining. General Electric's approach, popularly called "boulwareism," grew out of a 1946
strike which caused an extensive review of the company's labor policies. The company decided that it had to "sell" its job program to
the employees, and that the best way to do this was to put forward
its best offer at the first bargaining session, so that employees could
influence the union to accept it. The object was to sell the program
directly to the individual employee by every means of communication at the company's disposal. Thus, management set itself up as
the final arbiter of what was "good" for the workers.
that to sustain such an attitude would make the duty to bargain a mere play on words.
In effect, there would be nothing left to bargain about.
112 H. K. Porter Co., 153 N.L.R.B. No. 119 (1965).
113 336 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1964). Contra Globe-Union, Inc., 97 N.L.B. 1026
(1952), where the Board refused to find bad faith in a response to a casual union inquiry, not pressed, that the employer's hiring policy was not a proper matter for discussion, and he would hire whom he pleased.
114 NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952). See also NLRB v.
Berkley Mach. Works & Foundry Co., 189 F.2d 904 (4th Cir. 1951). Here the employer did not insist on a management rights clause, but refused to formulate the
existing wage rates into the agreement. The court inferred from this that management
was attempting to reserve exclusive control over wage rates and merit increases, in violation of 5 8(a) (5). To like effect, where a management rights clause was directly
involved, see Majure Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 198 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1952).
1 15
White v. NLRB, 255 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1958). See also Arkansas-Louisiana
Gas Co., 154 N.L.R.B. No. 72 (1965); NLRB v. Lewin-Mathes Co., 285 F.2d 329 (7th
Cir. 1960), where the court upheld management's right to exclusive control over work
assignments, particularly in an area where jurisdictional work disputes with other unions
were likely.
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The Board, in a highly publicized decision, held that this approach did not satisfy the necessity to bargain in good faith and
amounted to a refusal to bargain." 6 The Board ruled that this attitude was a deliberate attempt to by-pass the union and discredit it in
the eyes of its members. Moreover, it evinced no desire to resolve
differences and reach a common ground of agreement, as envisioned
in the LMRA. Subsequent decisions have solidified the Boards's repudiation of this "take it or leave it""' attitude, and it apparently is
conclusive evidence of the employer's bad faith.
(9) Transcripts of Negotiations.-Periodically,a union will
voice objection to the employer's insistence that a stenographic record be kept of all bargaining sessions. In 1951, the NLRB held
that insistence on such a record was evidence of bad faith on management's part."' Although it upheld an overall charge of bad
faith bargaining, the First Circuit disagreed with the Board regarding
the company's insistence on a transcript. In NLRB v. Reed & Prince
Mfg. Co.,11"9 the court said:
[We are not inclined to agree with the Board that the Company's insistence, over the Union's strenuous objection, on having
a stenotypist present at all the bargaining meetings to take down a
verbatim transcript of the proceedings was evidence of the Company's bad faith.' 20
The Board indicated its dissatisfaction with this decision in a later
opinion by absolving a union of a failure to bargain charge when it
refused to meet with an employer who insisted on keeping a transcript of the proceedings.'' Then, in 1965, the Board broke
squarely with the First Circuit in holding that an employer who refused to bargain without a stenographic record was guilty of bad
faith.12 When the Board petitioned for enforcement of its order, it
was once again chastised, this time by the Eighth Circuit. In NLRB
v. Southern Transp., Inc.," the court held that an employer can re116 General Elec. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. No. 36 (1964).

117See, e.g., Palm Beach Post-Times, 151 N.I.R.B. No. 114 (1965), where the
Board found bad faith bargaining when an employer made a sudden final offer to the
union, said there was nothing further to discuss, and that if the union wanted to accept
the offer they could call him at home. See also Vicker's, Inc., 153 N.L.R.B. No. 45
(1965); Sunbeam Plastics Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1010 (1963).
118 Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887
(1953).
119 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,346 U.S. 887 (1953).
0
12 NIRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 139 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 887 (1953).
121 Graphic Arts Ass'n of St. Louis, Inc., 149 N.L.R.B. No. 71 (1964).
122 Southern Transp., Inc., 150 N.L.R.B. No. 20 (1964).
223 355 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1966).
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fuse to bargain unless the union agrees to allow a certified transcript
of all proceedings, paid for by the employer. The court emphasized
that the employer had been guilty of bad faith bargaining in the
past, and that he was in a quandary unless he could prove his good
faith by a transcript. Thus the most recent rulings on stenographic
records seem to uphold the employer's right to insist on one as a condition of bargaining.
The discussion thus far illustrates the varying approaches of the
NLRB and the courts toward specific types of employer conduct. A
single act might be held to be a per se violation of section 8(a)(5)
without a showing of bad faith, it might be conclusive evidence of
management's bad faith, or it might be only evidence to be considered
in conjunction with other activities. The courts have generally
agreed with the NLRB as to these three categories, while disagreeing
occasionally as to what acts fall within each grouping. An area in
which the courts and the Board have completely disagreed is the
category of conduct known as unilateral economic pressure.
III.

ECONOMIC PRESSURE AND THE INSURANCE
AGENTS CASE

In 1956, following expiration of its contract with Prudential Insurance Company, the Insurance Agent's Union instituted a "work
without contract" program against Prudential, which consisted of
concerted on-the-job activities designed to harass the company.
These activities included a refusal by the agents to write new policies, tardiness in reporting to work, slowdowns, petitioning policy
holders, and refusing to attend company-called conferences or make
out required reports. Although negotiations continued toward an
eventual agreement, the company filed a refusal to bargain charge
against the union. The NLRB found the union guilty of a refusal to
bargain; 24 however, the court of appeals denied enforcement of the
order,'25 and the Board appealed to the Supreme Court. In NLRB
v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union,'26 the Court dismissed the Board's
argument that the work-without-contract activity was a per se violation of the LMRA. The majority further said that such economic
pressure tactics were legitimate bargaining weapons in the union's
arsenal, and their use was completely consistent with the duty to bar124 Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 768 (1957), rev'd, 260 F.2d 736
(D.C. Cir. 1958), aff'd, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
125 Insurance Agents' Int'l Union v. NLRB, 260 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1958), a!f'd,
361 U.S. 477 (1960).
126 NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
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gain in good faith. There was no evidence of anything but willingness on the part of the union to reach an agreement, and the Court
felt there was no inconsistency between economic pressure and good
faith collective bargaining, In summary, the Court said:
The scope of § 8(b) (3) and the limitations on Board power
which were the design of § 8(d) are exceeded, we hold, by inferring a lack of good faith not from any deficiencies of the union's
performance at the bargaining table by reason of its attempted use
of economic pressure, but solely and simply because tactics designed to exert economic pressure 2were
employed during the
7
course of the good-faith negotiations.
Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion joined by Justices
Harlan and Whittaker,'2 8 took issue with the broad language of the
majority opinion. While agreeing that there was not enough evidence to justify the refusal to bargain charge, the concurring justices
stated that the ultimate issue upon which the Board must pass in
each such charge was the state of mind of the offending party. This
could only be discovered by a consideration of all the circumstances
surrounding the negotiations, and the three concurring justices
thought that the majority's language foreclosed the Board from ever
finding even an inference of bad faith from the use of pressure tactics
during bargaining. The concurring opinion thus represented a compromise position between the Board's characterization of economic
harassing tactics as a refusal to bargain per se, and the majority's
refusal to consider them as any evidence at all in examining a section 8(a) (5) charge.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has examined several refusal
to bargain charges against employers which involved the use of economic pressure tactics. Since the LMRA imposes the same duties
and sanctions on both management and the unions in regard to the
duty to bargain," 9 the InsuranceAgents case is directly applicable to
the use of economic pressure by the employer. The only complicating factor is that the unfair labor practices chargeable against an
employer overlap to a considerable extent. Thus, particular acts
which could be a refusal to bargain under section 8(a) (5) might
easily be discriminatory against the union-a section 8 (a) (3) violation - or an interference with the rights guaranteed by section 7
of the act' - a section 8(a) (1) violation. Frequently all three vioat 490.
at 501.
129 See notes 1, 4, and 5 supra, for the text of the appropriate statutory sections.
-30 The basic provisions of § 8 (a) (3) prevent an employer from encouraging or
127 Id.
128 Id.
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lations are alleged in the same complaint. Since it is usually easier
to find that certain activities are discriminatory against the union, or
interfere with section 7 rights, these charges are pursued more often
on final argument than the cumbersome bad faith charge or the economic harassment problem of the InsuranceAgents case.
The most frequently utilized weapon of an employer is the lockout. In NLRB v. Brown,'3 ' the Supreme Court upheld the use of a
multi-employer lockout to combat a "whipsaw"'3 2 strike. The employers, a food retail store group, had locked out union employees
who supported striking members and hired temporary replacements
to continue operations. The NLRB had previously held that a
multi-employer lockout to combat a whipsaw strike was a legitimate
pressure tactic, 3 ' but refused to sanction replacement of strikers by
anyone but the striking members.
The Court rejected the Board's contention that the replacement
was a per se violation of the act which carried its own indicia of unlawful intent. The Court was willing to balance the discriminatory
effect of the activity against an honest employer intent to achieve
legitimate bargaining and business ends. In light of these goals,
and the "slight" tendency of the lockout to discourage union mem134
bership, the lockouts were held to be justified.
A second significant case involving a lockout was American
Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB. 135 There, the employer, a ship repair
company whose work was highly seasonal, had engaged in fruitless
negotiations with eight unions for new contracts. Fearing a strike
at a time of the year when its seasonal work was at a peak, the company locked out employees at two of its four ship repair yards on the
great lakes. Although negotiations continued, and a new contract
was signed two months after the lockout began, the court of appeals
upheld a cease and desist order of the Board, based on violations of
sections 8(a) (1) and (3) of the act.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the issue was concisely stated
by Justice Stewart:
discouraging membership in a labor organization, with the exception of the union shop.
Section 8 (a) (1) prevents the employer from interfering with the rights guaranteed
to employees in § 7, including the right to form labor unions and to strike. Any act
which violates § 8(a) (5) must also necessarily be a violation of § 8(a) (1).
'31 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
132 A "whipsaw" strike is a total strike by a union against one of a group of employers with whom the union bargains and maintains contracts.
3-3 NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
' 34 NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
135 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
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The question presented is . . . whether an employer commits an
unfair labor practice under... the Act when he temporarily lays
off or "locks out" his employees during a labor dispute to bring
economic pressure in support of his bargaining position. 136
The Court answered this question in the negative quoting from In-

surance Agents" 7 that economic activity in support of a bargaining
position does not violate the act. Therefore, a lockout which was
intended merely to bring about a settlement of a labor dispute on
favorable terms and which did not indicate an intention to discriminate against the union, could not properly be construed as an unfair
labor practice.
It is interesting to note that none of these lockout cases involved
a refusal to bargain charge in the final arguments before the Supreme Court. In the American Ship Bldg. case,' however, such
a charge was prosecuted before the Board but was dropped when
the agreement was reached on a new contract. In referring to the
charge, the Supreme Court said: 'The passage quoted below in the
text of this opinion from Labor Board v. Insurance Agents' Int'l
Union... has even more direct application to the § 8(a) (5) question."' ' The obvious implication was that if no agreement had been
reached, the section 8 (a) (5) issue might properly have been pursued
to a decision. The question which remains unanswered is whether, in
a proper setting, the Court would ever consider the lockout as some
indication of the employer's bad faith in bargaining. From the
language of the majority, such a result seems unlikely. The Court's
willingness to look at all the evidence in determining the employer's
state of mind concerning a section 8(a) (3) charge in Brown 40 seems
directly opposed to its unwillingness to consider harassing activities
as any indication of a refusal to bargain under section 8(a) (5).
While the NLRB and the lower federal courts have generally
paid lip service to the Insurance Agents doctrine, there has been a
significant trend toward the reasoning of Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion.' 4 ' In Kennedy v. Long Island R.R.,'z the court
was asked to hold that a strike insurance plan, instituted by the railroad to minimize the effects of selective strike tactics, was an under1 6 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 301-02 (1965).
'37 NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
138American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NIRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
139 Id. at 306 n.5.
140 NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
141 See text accompanying notes 142-49 infra.
142 319 F.2d 366 (2d Cir.), cert.denied, 375 U.S. 830 (1963).
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mining of the union's guaranteed right to strike, hence a per se
violation of the Railway Labor Act.'4 3 The court dismissed this
argument, saying that a per se violation was only that conduct which
necessarily interfered with the employee's rights under the act.
Since a strike insurance plan did not interfere with the union's right
to strike, but only diminished the strike's effects, it was an economic
tactic perfectly consistent with the duty to bargain in good faith.
However, the court departed from the Insurance Agents doctrine in
holding that the total surrounding circumstances could be considered in evaluating the intent of the parties at the bargaining table. This could include any history of employer-union animus, the
extent of the insurance coverage, and the exertion of economic pressures as an index of the union's capacity to withstand work stoppages. The court quoted from Frankfurter's concurring opinion in
Insurance Agents, which stated:
"[W1n determining the state .of mind of a party to collective bargaining negotiations the Board does not deal in terms of abstract
.economic pressure.' It must proceed in terms of specific conduct
which it weighs as a more or less reliable manifestation
of the
144
state of mind with which bargaining is conducted."'
A second significant case which circumvented the teaching of
Insurance Agents was NLRB v. Cascade Employer's Ass'n.4 5
There, the NLRB found that an employer's association committed
an unfair labor practice when, after bargaining to a stalemate with
the union, it advised its members to make certain unilateral changes
in wages and working conditions. 4 ' The circuit court, in a preKatz 47 decision, held that such a conclusion marked a return to the
rejected per se doctrine of Insurance Agents and remanded the case
to the Board for additional findings as to the employer's state of
mind. The court held that such "pressure" tactics as unilateral
changes might properly be considered as evidence of the employer's
intent. Quoting extensively from both the majority and minority
opinions in Insurance Agents, the court adopted Justice Frankfurter's
143 44 Star. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1964).
The Railway Labor
Act contains basically the same provisions regarding employee's rights as the I.MRA,
and decisions under one act are often cited as analogous in construing the other.
144 NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 505 (1960); Kennedy v.
Long Island R.R, 319 F.2d 366, 371 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 83 (1963).
145 296 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1961).
146 Cascade Employers Ass'n, Inc., 126 N.L.R.B. 1014 (1960), remanded, 296 F.2d
42 (9th Cir. 1961).
147 NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
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Other courts have also

chosen to follow the reasoning of the Frankfurter concurring opinion, either deliberately or unknowingly.149
In the cases where it has been followed, the Insurance Agents

doctrine has led to some questionable results. In Hawaii Meat Co.
v. NLRB,"' the comipany arranged terms of a subcontracting agreement with an outside shipper, such contract to go into effect the instant that an impending trucker's strike was called. The union
charged that this was a refusal to bargain on the issue of subcontracting under section 8(a) (5). Relying heavily on the language of Insurance Agents, the court of appeals for the seventh circuit decided
that the LMRA imposed no duty on an employer to bargain over the
issue of subcontracting when it was being employed as an economic
weapon to combat a work-crippling strike.
As to the uni148 NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
lateral wage increases, the case is of doubtful reliability following Katz unless a genuine
impasse existed. However, the opinion contained the following quotation:
[I n order to determine whether the respondent has bargained with the requisite good faith, the Board may not condemn the action by itself, but must, if
it is to determine intent, inquire into the totality of circumstances surrounding the bargaining ... From a reading of the decision of the Board it is apparent that it has adhered to the rejected per se rule in this case. Nowhere
is there a finding concerning the respondent's state of mind based upon a
"totality of the evidence." Id. at 48.
Thus, not only is the case doubtful precedent for the unilateral wage increases, but it
also does not reflect the reasoning of the majority opinion of Insurance Agents - the
case on which it relies.
49
1
See Cheney Cal. Lumber Co. v. NLRB, 319 F.2d 375 (9th Cit. 1963). The
court refused to find a per se violation of the act in a strike which violated a no-strike
contract clause, saying that a contract violation was never automatically an unfair
labor practice. The important language from the Insurance Agents standpoint, however, was the following: "Whether the conduct of the Union in calling the strike constitutes a refusal to bargain in good faith must be determined not on a per se basis but
upon a scrutiny of the circumstances taken in their entirety." Id. at 378. Other courts
have distinguished InsuranceAgents, sometimes on rather flimsy grounds. In Standard
Oil Co. v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 40 (1963), enfordng 137.N.LR.B. 690 (1962), an international union put pressure on a local agent not to sign an agreement it had negotiated with Standard Oil Company in Ohio, because negotiations were troubled or stalled
at three other refineries. Although this was economic pressure of the same order as
occurred in Insurance Agents, the court distinguished that case in finding a § 8(b) (3)
violation, on the somewhat hazy grounds that it had involved harassing economic pressure on the part of parties to the negotiations - not those negotiating on a separate
contract. Similarly, in Crestline Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 256 (1961), the Board sustained a
§ 8 (a) (5) charge against an employer who suddenly discontinued payment of his portion of a group insurance policy for employees, the night before a proposed increase
in the plan was to be put to a plant vote. The parties had bargained to an impasse on
the issue, and the employer maintained that his action was only an economic pressure
tactic designed to bring about a favorable settlement, and was justified by the Insurance Agents holding. The Board said that the action was unilateral manipulation of
terms and conditions of employment, and the fact that it incidentally exerted economic
pressure did not save it from being an unfair labor practice.
150 321 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1963).
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As indicated by the court in Hawaii, the use of subcontracting
as an economic weapon might have been justified by economic necessity. However, the Insurance Agents doctrine has caused other
courts to justify employer conduct that was decidedly reprehensible.
In NLRB v. Great Falls Employer's Council, Inc.,.51 an employer's
association locked out members of a union engaged in a whipsaw
strike. Under Montana law, the laid-off employees were eligible
for unemployment benefits totaling thirty-two dollars a week.'5 2
If any candidate earned over sixteen dollars a week in regular employment, however, he was ineligible for any benefits. The association adopted the practice of hiring the workers for two days a week
so they earned over sixteen dollars, then releasing them and recalling
them the next week. On the authority of Insurance Agents the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Board's cease and desist
order, holding that the practice was simply a legitimate economic
weapon which the Board could not consider as evidence of an unfair
labor practice.
Under the Insurance Agents doctrine, the NLRB and the courts
can only analyze the conduct of the parties at the bargaining table,
and must ignore any outside economic harassment as evidence of bad
faith bargaining. This view is unfortunate in that it presupposes
that collective bargaining takes place in a vacuum. The closed door
of the bargaining room cannot shut out the effects of harassing
tactics and coercion on the participants' positions. Viewed in light
of this attitude, collective bargaining takes on the aspects of an
Indian-wrestling contest, with the Board assuming the role of referee.
The contestants are allowed to use any type of external leverage, and
the rules forbid the referee to intervene as long as both parties keep
their elbows on the table.
In today's complicated industrial society, it is becoming increasingly obvious that this concept of "power" bargaining is not the final answer to our national labor problems. One partial solution to
increasing industrial strife would be to overrule the Insurance
Agents doctrine and allow the NLRB to examine all the evidence in
a refusal to bargain charge. Although the Board cannot and should
not be allowed to dictate the terms of collective agreements, a closer
watch over bargaining activities by the Board would be bound to
have a conciliatory effect on both sides, and lead to faster and more
equitable settlements. It seems somewhat of a paradox that the
151 277 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1960).
152 Mont. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 140.
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government should create a special- tribunal such as the NLRB, with
expertise in dealing with specialized problems, and at the same time
allow it to be hampered by judicial decisions which allow it to consider only partial evidence.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Judicial interpretation of the refusal to bargain sections of the
Taft-Hartley Act has resulted in the grouping of management activities into several more or less distinct categories. The first of
these -

the per se violation -

is an automatic refusal to bargain

regardless of the employer's good or bad faith. The concept of per
se violations achieved respectability in the Katz decision in 1962
and it seems likely that the types of these violations included in this
Note will increase in the near future.
Beyond the per se violations, there is a wide range of employer
activity which is evidence of a refusal to bargain, and requires a
finding of the employer's bad faith before the charge will be sustained. Such activities vary from single acts which are conclusive
evidence of bad faith, such as the now defunct take-it-or-leave-it attitude, to acts which are only slight evidence and would be inconclusive standing alone. An example in. this latter category would be
anti-union statements.
A final category of employer activity is the type of harassing
activities which brings economic pressure to bear in support of management's bargaining position. The Supreme Court has said that
this type of conduct is perfectly consistent with the duty to bargain
in good faith, and cannot be considered as evidence of bad faith.
The NLRB has been somewhat reluctant to follow this reasoning,
since it results in the withdrawal of a significant part of the evidence from Board consideration. It is difficult not to sympathize
with the Board in this respect, since the judicial attitude on economic
activity does seem to hamper the Board's over-all effectiveness.
FRANCIS A. KING

